Federal Circuit Makes a Leap in Logic: The Dangerous Upstream Use of Related Patents\u27 Prosecution History to Interpret Claims in Already Issued Patents, The by Mudd, Jason R.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 1 Winter 2005 Article 13 
Winter 2005 
Federal Circuit Makes a Leap in Logic: The Dangerous Upstream 
Use of Related Patents' Prosecution History to Interpret Claims in 
Already Issued Patents, The 
Jason R. Mudd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jason R. Mudd, Federal Circuit Makes a Leap in Logic: The Dangerous Upstream Use of Related Patents' 
Prosecution History to Interpret Claims in Already Issued Patents, The, 70 MO. L. REV. (2005) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
The Federal Circuit Makes a "Leap in Logic":
The Dangerous Upstream Use of Related
Patents' Prosecution History to Interpret
Claims in Already Issued Patents
Microsoft Corporation v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.",2 Courts emphasize two mechanisms by which patents fulfill
their instrumental justification. The possibility of obtaining a patent monop-
oly encourages investment in research to make new inventions, and disclo-
sure of new inventions increases the amount of public knowledge.
An invention is "patentable" if it falls within an eligible subject matter
category5 and "satisfies the statutory requisites of novelty, nonobviousness,
utility, and adequate disclosure."6 That is, an invention must be new, not ob-
vious in light of existing art, useful, and sufficiently described. A patent al-
lows the patentee "to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering
to sell the claimed invention." 7 The patent's claims define the bounds of this
1. 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
2. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024 (1989).
4. Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). A verson who "invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title." Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted eligibile subject
matter broadly, holding that "anything under the sun that is made by man" is patent
eligible. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
6. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 57 (2d
ed. 2003).
7. Id. at 525; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in
this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."), held unconsti-
tutional by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (as applied to suits for patent infringement against state govern-
ments).
1
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right to exclude.8 Claim drafting, the initial attempt to define a patentee's
rights, has been defined as, "without doubt, the most difficult form of techni-
cal writing." 9 Once a dispute arises, claim interpretation is the most essential
step in defining a patentee's rights and determining whether infringement has
occurred. 10
Not surprisingly, trial courts struggle with claim construction and the
Federal Circuit, the court with exclusive jurisdiction over all patent appeals,
changes the trial court's claim construction about 40 percent of the time." To
construe claims, courts must examine the language of the claims themselves,
the rest of the patents' specifications, and, if in evidence, the prosecution
history.' 2 Courts will often look to the prosecution history of related patents
to aid in interpreting claims consistently within a patent family.' 3
The Federal Circuit, in Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.,
used prosecution history from a subsequent related patent application to limit
claim language in an earlier patent and settle an important legal battle affect-
ing the rapidly growing internet telephony industry. 14 This Note examines the
majority's seemingly logical reasoning but ultimately agrees with the analysis
of Judge Rader's dissent.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Multi-Tech Systems, Inc., owns a series of patents related to methods
for simultaneously transmitting digital voice data and digital computer data.
15
These related patents all derive from the same parent application 16 and share a
common specification, or written description.' 7 On February 15, 2000, Multi-
8. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 525.
9. Id. at 533.
10. See id. at 525.
11. Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredicatability in Patent Litiga-
tion: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 175, 175 (2001).
12. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
13. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Morehouse Indus., Inc., 143 F.3d 1456, 1460 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
14. See Declan McCullagh, Microsoft Wards off Voice-Data Lawsuit, CNET
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-101 4 _3-5153929.html.
15. Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
16. Id. See also U.S. Patent No. 5,452,289 (issued Sept. 19, 1995).
17. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1342. Related applications which derive from a parent
patent share the same specification. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
Nos. Civ. 00-1412 ADM/RLE, Civ. 00-1627 ADM/RLE, 2002 WL 1949755, at *1
(D. Minn. Aug. 16, 2002) (mem.), aff'd, 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
[Vol. 70
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Tech filed suit against Net2Phone, Inc., in the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota alleging infringement of four of its patents.' 8 Four
months later, apparently fearing that it might also be infringing on those pat-
ents,19 Microsoft filed suit against Multi-Tech in the same court seeking "a
declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability of
seven Multi-Tech patents." 20 Multi-Tech answered with a counterclaim alleg-
ing infringement of five of its patents.2' The interpretation of claims from
these five patents, United States Patent No. 5,452,289 ("the '289 Patent"),
United States Patent No. 5,471,470 ("the '470 Patent"), United States Patent
No. 5,600,649 ("the '649 Patent"), United States Patent No 5,764,627 ("the
'627 Patent"), and United States Patent No. 5,790,532 ("the '532 Patent"),
was at issue during the district court's Markman Hearing. 22
The district court issued a single Markman order construing the disputed
claims for the two cases.23 Primarily, the court concluded that Mutli-Tech's
claimed inventions were limited to simultaneous voice-data transmission over
a direct point-to-point telephone connection and thus did not include trans-
mission over a packet-switched network, such as the Intemet.24 The district
court, relying on statements made by Multi-Tech to the examiner during
prosecution of the '627 patent, concluded that Multi-Tech had excluded
25transmission through a packet-switched network, such as the Internet. The
district court also construed other terms in the claims of the patents at issue,
but these constructions were not ultimately relevant to the Federal Circuit's
decision.
26
18. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1344 (alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos.
5,452,289, 5,600,649, and 5,764,627, as well as U.S. Patent No. 5,471,470).
19.. McCullagh, supra note 14.
20. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1344.
21. Id. ("alleging that Microsoft infringed the '289, '470, '649, '627, and '532
patents").
22. Id. Markman hearings are conducted by the district court to perform claim
construction as a matter of law, the first step in an infringement analysis.
23. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1344 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
Nos. Civ. 00-1412 ADM/RLE, Civ. 00-1627 ADM/RLE, 2002 WL 1949755 (D.
Minn. Aug. 16, 2002) (mem.)).
24. Id. at 1344-45. "A 'circuit-switched network,' such as the Public Switched
Telephone Network, is one in which a connection is established from one user to the
other such that the users have exclusive and full use of the circuit until the connection
is released." Id. at 1345 n.2 (citing HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DIC-
TIONARY 190-91 (5th ed. 1992)). "In contrast, a 'packet-switched network,' such as
the Internet, is one in which data packets are relayed through various stations on a
network. The packets comprising a message may travel along different paths and
arrive at different times, but are reassembled in proper sequence at their destination."
Id. (citing MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER DICTIONARY 253 (1991)).
25. Id. at 1344-45.
26. Id. at 1351-54 (construing the terms "headers," "multiplexing," "hands-free
speaker phone," "full-duplex speaker phone," and "digitizing"). The Federal Circuit
3
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After Multi-Tech conceded that Microsoft and Net2Phone did not in-
fringe literally or through equivalents under the district court's claim con-
structions, the district court entered final judgments in the two cases.2 7 Multi-
Tech then appealed both cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. By a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's claim construction and final judgments against Multi-Tech. The Fed-
eral Circuit held that "the asserted claims of the '649, '627, and '532 patents
[were] limited to communications over a telephone line and ... exclude[ed]
communications over a packet-switched network such as the Intemet."
29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Claim Construction Generally
Claims "are the most important part of the modem patent document."
30
As "the essence of the legal right granted by a patent," claims are "'the por-
tion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights.' '31 In modem
American claiming practice, known as peripheral claiming, the claims define
the boundaries of the patented invention.32 Thus, "[p]atent claim language
defines the scope of the [patentee's] invention." 33 Claiming technique is regu-
lated by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which mandates that
did spend considerable time revising these peripheral claim constructions made by the
district court, but only for purposes of judicial efficiency and future litigation. Id. at
1350-51.
27. Id. at 1345.
28. Id. Multi-Tech appealed the Microsoft judgment with respect to the construc-
tion of the '649, '627, and '532 patents and appealed the Net2Phone judgment with
respect to the '649 and '627 patents. Id.
29. Id. at 1354.
30. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (3d ed. 2002).
31. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 372
(1996)). Claims are analogous to the "'metes and bounds' of a real property deed." Id.
Claim drafting is an art which patent attorneys attempt to master in trying to obtain an
intellectual property right as broad as the United States Patent and Trademark Office
will allow for their clients' inventions. Id. at 26.
32. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.1, at 112 (4th ed.
2003); see also ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 526. Peripheral patent claiming,
prevalent since 1900 in the U.S., is distinct from the prior method of central claiming,
under which patents frequently had one or two claims. See ANTHONY W. DELLER,
PATENT CLAIMS §§ 5-11, at 12-20 (2d ed. 1971); RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS §§
4-9, at 4-9 (1949).
33. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing references omitted).
[Vol. 70
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claims consist of a single English sentence. 34 A claims is a statutorily re-
quired35 component of the patent's specification, or written description of the
invention.
3 6
Claim construction37 is the first step38 in the two-step patent infringe-
ment analysis. 39 In the seminal Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,40 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that judges, not juries, should be charged with the
responsibility of claim construction, as a question of law, reviewable under a
de novo standard on appeal. 4 1 This holding was based largely on a recognized
need for "certainty and predictability" in claim construction.4 2 Claim con-
struction has been described as giving meanin to the language of the
claims, 43 as determining the scope of the claims,R and as determining both
the meaning and scope of the claims.45
34. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 30, at 29. The "one-sentence rule" was upheld
in Fressola v. Manbeck, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1211 (D. D.C. 1995).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
36. The requirements of a specification, as mandated by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), are:
1. title;
2. cross-reference to related applications;
3. statement regarding government rights;
4. background: (a) field of the invention, and (b) description of related art;
5. summary of the invention;
6. brief description of the drawings;
7. detailed description of the invention, including the best mode (or de-
scription of the preferred embodiment);
8. claims; and
9. abstract of the disclosure.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, § 2.III.B.1, at 14 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2002); PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 601 (8th ed. 2001, rev. 2003)).
37. Courts often use the terms "claim construction" and "claim interpretation"
interchangeably. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 747 n.2; see generally Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
38. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
39. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing the two-step process of infringement determination).
40. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
41. ld. at 388 (concluding that judges, not juries, "are... better suited to find the
acquired meaning of patent terms").
42. Bender, supra note 11, at 198.
43. See, e.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1297
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Spectrum Int'l v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
44. See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 231 F.3d 859,
864 (Fed. Cir. 2000), superseded in part on rehearing by 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Zodiac Pool Care v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1413 (Fed. Cir.
5
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Although the procedural issues associated with claim construction have
been left largely to trial courts' discretion, many courts conduct Markman
Hearings where parties dispute issues of claim construction and the court
typically issues a Markman Order construing the patent claims at issue.
46
Only the claim language that is in dispute needs to be construed.47 Claim
construction is often dispositive in infringement analysis 48 as parties may
stipulate to non-infringement, given the court's claim construction, in order to
allow the court to render an appealable final judgment.49 Appeal is an attrac-
tive option, because the Federal Circuit alters the district court's claim con-
struction roughly 40 percent of the time.50 Commentators question whether
this is the type of "certainty or predictability" the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit had intended to result from the Markman opinions.
51
"Claim construction 'begins and ends' with the actual words of the
claims," 52 but the actual words are only part of the construction analysis. Af-
ter first looking to the claim language itself, the court will determine if the
language is unambiguous and clear on its face. 53 If it is, then the court need
not consider any other intrinsic evidence.5 4 But, when a claim term can have
more than one common meaning or the applicability of the common meaning
is unclear, then the court may refer to other intrinsic evidence, including the
specification and prosecution history. 55 The court must examine the written
description and drawings to determine whether the use of a term is consistent
2000); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (noting that claim language defines the scope of a claim).
45. See, e.g., IMS Techs., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
46. Bender, supra note 11, at 201-02.
47. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 977 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
48. See, e.g., Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d
951, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d
985, 988-89 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Wang Labs., Inc. v. AOL, 197 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
49. Indeed, this is precisely what the parties did in the instant case. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Bender, supra note 11, at 207.
51. Id. at 208-09.
52. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, § 5.1, at 114-15 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Mar-
poss Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
53. Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (examining first the claim language).
54. Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
55. Bender, supra note 11, at 211-12.
[Vol. 70
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with its ordinary meaning.56 Courts are to interpret the claims "in light of the
specification of which they are a part," 57 and correspondingly determine
"whether the patentee has disclaimed subject matter or has otherwise limited
the scope of the claims,"58 but courts are not to read limitations into the
claims from the written description.59 There is a "fine line between reading a
claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from
the specification." 60 By consulting the intrinsic evidence first, courts allow
the applicant to "act as his own lexicographer and use the specification to
implicitly or explicitly supply new meanings for terms." 6'
Prosecution history is the other main source of intrinsic evidence used
by the court to construe a patent's claims. During prosecution of a patent, the
patent examiner will issue an office action and often reject certain claims
which read on the "prior art.''62 Such rejections must be made in order to en-
force the statutory requirement that the claimed invention be novel.6 3 The
applicant will often amend claims to overcome such rejections. 64 Under the
case law, it is clear that amendments made to avoid prior art will give rise to
"file wrapper estoppel," also known as "prosecution history estoppel." 65 This
doctrine prevents the court from construing a claim in a manner that would
allow the inventor to regain claim scope that she had surrendered or limited
during prosecution. 66 Although the U.S. Supreme Court only recently held, in
its landmark 2002 Festo decision, that any amendments "'made to satisfy any
requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel,"' 67 it has long
been recognized that amendments made to avoid prior art references give rise
56. Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
57. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
58. Prima Tek II, 318 F.3d at 1148; see also SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
59. Prima Tek11, 318 F.3d at 1151.
60. Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
61. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
62. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, §§ 2.I1I.D.2, 4 I.C.
63. Id. § 4.I.C.
64. Id. § 2 III.D.3.
65. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.05, at 18-789 (rev. 2003).
66. Id. at 18-786.
67. Id. §18.05[2][b][ii], at 18-842 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002)). The Supreme Court, in Warner-
Jenkinson, had left open the question of what types of amendments can give rise to an
estoppel. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997)).
7
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to an estoppel.68 Basically, that which an inventor gives up during prosecu-
tion to avoid reading on the prior art, he cannot later reclaim during claim
construction. 69 But, courts require that an applicant "clearly and unambigu-
ously express any such surrender" of claim scope before they will hold that
the applicant actually disclaimed claim scope.
70
Finally, after looking at the plain language of the claim, read in light of
the written description, drawings, embodiments, and prosecution history, a
court may look to extrinsic evidence7 ' to construe claim language. 2 But, ex-
trinsic evidence may never be relied on to contradict the clear meaning of
terms in the claims. 73 If resort to the specification and prosecution history
alone will resolve ambiguity in a disputed claim term, then it is improper to
rely on extrinsic evidence. 74 Rarely, intrinsic evidence is insufficient to inter-
pret particular claim language and a court must rely on extrinsic evidence.
75
B. Claim Construction Involving Related Applications
Various procedural mechanisms exist through which inventors may file
later related applications based on an original parent application. 6 Intuitively,
the prosecution history of a parent application may limit the scope of a later
application containing the same claim term. 77 The prosecution history regard-
ing a claim limitation in an issued parent application applies with equal force
68. Id. §18.05[3][a][iv], at 18-915. See, e.g., N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney,
224 F. 452 (8th Cir. 1915).
69. Pall Corp. v. PTI Techs. Inc., 259 F.3d 1383, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is
well-established that '[t]he prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms
so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution."') (quot-
ing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995))
(alteration in original), vacated by 535 U.S. 1109 (2002); see also Ekchian v. Home
Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[B]y distinguishing the claimed
invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover, he
is by implication surrendering such protection.").
70. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
71. Extrinsic evidence includes things such as expert testimony as to how the
disputed claim terms would be defined in industry by ordinary persons skilled in the
art.
72. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
73. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
arJ'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
74. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
75. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, § 5.I.A.3.c, at 127 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1585).
76. These include "continuations," "continuations-in-part," and "divisional"
applications. 5A CHISUM, supra note 65, § 18.0512][d][ii], at 18-891.
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to subsequently issued patents derived from the parent that contain the same
claim limitation. 78 Even absent an actual claim limitation, arguments made
concerning common subject matter in a parent application to distinguish a
prior art reference can be used to limit claim scope in a child application. 79 A
broad range of conduct can give rise to an estoppel, including "representa-
tions made during the prosecution of the parent application." 80 In Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., s l the Federal Circuit confirmed
that arguments made voluntarily without amendment can create an estoppel if
they evidence surrender of subject matter.8 2
Prosecution history of one sibling application can be used to interpret
claim terms in another sibling application derived from a common parent. In
Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 8 3 two related patents had issued from continuation-
in-part applications derived from a common parent application. 84 The Federal
Circuit held that the prosecution history of a claim limitation in the first pat-
ent issued was properly applied to the same claim limitation in the second
patent to issue.
85
"Estoppel may arise whether the change [to the claim is achieved] by
amendment ... or by refiling [of the application] with changed claims. ' 86 In
Mark I Marketing Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,87 the Federal Circuit
stated that the relevant prosecution history included, "not only the. . . appli-
cation [upon which the patent issued] but also the parent ... and grandparent
... applications." 88 In Mark I Marketing, the applicant had filed two succes-
sive continuation-in-part applications in response to rejections made by the
examiner based on prior art references. 89 The continuations' new claims were
narrower than those in the parent application so as to avoid the prior art refer-
78. Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("When multiple patents derive from the same initial application, the prosecution
history regarding a claim limitation in any patent that has issued applies with equal
force to subsequently issued patents that contain the same claim limitation.").
79. Wang Labs., Inc. v. AOL, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (a
patentee argued that a statement it made during prosecution distinguishing a prior art
reference "was in the parent application and does not apply to the continuation-in-part
that is the ... patent. However, this subject matter is common to the continuation-in-
part application, and argument concerning the.., reference was correctly viewed as
applying to the common subject matter.").
80. Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
81. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rev'don other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
82. Id. at 568.
83. 903 F.2d 812 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
84. Id. at 814.
85. Id. at 821.
86. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
87. 66 F.3d 285 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
88. Id. at 291.
89. Id. at 291-92.
9
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ences. 90 The Federal Circuit held that an estoppel could not be avoided
merely by filing continuations and that, viewing the prosecution history as a
whole, it was clear that the applicant had surrendered the broad scope of the
claims in the parent application in order to obtain an allowance of the claims
in the later applications.
9
'
In AI-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc.,92 the Federal Circuit held that
a claim limitation amendment in a parent application did not apply to three
subsequent related patents that did not contain the specific limitation and had
their own distinct limitations to avoid prior art.9 3 The later applications did
not require the limitation from the parent in order to avoid prior art.94 Rather,
the applications contained specific limitations that independently allowed
them to be patentable.
95
It seems clear from the case law that estoppels can operate "down-
stream"; that is, narrowing amendments in prior applications can limit subse-
quent related applications, at least where those amendments were made to
avoid prior art. In light of this, patent scholar Donald Chisum had raised the
issue of whether estoppels should operate "upstream" in the same way they
operate downstream.96 Though no case had definitively answered this ques-
tion prior to the instant case, courts have discouraged the notion of upstream
estoppel.97 In Epic Metals Corp. v. Consolidated Systems, 98 a district court
suggested that upstream use of subsequent related applications would amount
to use of "extrinsic evidence," and could impede competitors' ability to rely
on the patent file. 99 However, in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co.,1°° the Federal Circuit held that a patentee could be bound by a
statement made to the PTO during prosecution of a subsequent related appli-
cation, provided that the examiner relied on this statement in allowing the
claims in the earlier patent. 01 Arguably, this holding, requiring reliance by
the examiner, should have foreclosed the court's ability to impose upstream
estoppel in the instant case, Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 292.
92. 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 1322-23.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 5A CHISUM, supra note 65, §18.05[2][d][ii], at 18-891.
97. See id. §18.05[2][d][ii], at 18-891 n.231.
98. 19 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
99. Id. at 1303.
100. 195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
101. Id. at 1333.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.,'0 2 the Federal Circuit
held that the scope of the Multi-Tech patents was limited to simultaneous
data-voice transmission over telephone lines, a circuit-switched network, and
did not include transmission over the Internet, a packet-switched network.1
0 3
The claim construction of three related.1 4 patents was at issue on appeal: the
'649 patent, the '627 patent, and the '532 patent.105 "The '532 patent claims
the transmission [and reception] of packetized voice and video data."' 0 6 "The
'649 patent claims the transmission [and reception] of packetized voice and
computer data."' 0 7 "[T]he '627 patent claims only the transmission [and re-
ception] of packetized voice data."'10 8 The majority relied on statements made
during the prosecution of the '627 patent to limit the scope of claims in the
already issued '649 patent.1 9 The relevant claim language of the '649 patent
recites a method for simultaneous transmission of voice and computer data,
with no limitation on the medium over which the data is transferred." 0 Dur-
ing the prosecution of the '627 patent, the examiner rejected all of the pend-
ing '627 claims as "obvious" over the "Lewen" patent, in light of the "Arbel"
patent."'I The "Lewen" patent covered simultaneous transmission of voice,
data, and image information, but only across a Local Area Network.12 Multi-
102. 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 1354.
104. The term "related" means that the patents all derived from the same parent
application (the '289 patent, in this case) and, as such, share a common specification.
See id. at 1347-48 & 1348 n.4.
105. Id. at 1345.
106. Id. at 1357 (Rader, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1349.
110. Id. at 1342. The language from claim I of the '649 patent at issue in this case
was:
placing headers on each of the compressed outgoing digital voice packets;
placing headers on each of the computer digital data packets; multiplexing
the compressed outgoing digital voice data packets with outgoing com-
puter digital data packets to produce an outgoing packet stream; transmit-
ting the outgoing packet stream; receiving multiplexed incoming data
which contains incoming computer digital data packets multiplexed with
the compressed incoming digital voice data packets; and demultiplexing
the incoming computer digital voice data packets.
Id. at 1343 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,600,649, col. 47, 11. 5-25 (issued Feb. 4, 1997)).
111. Id. at 1344. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000), inventions must be non-
obvious in light of the prior art in order to be patentable.
112. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1344.
11
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Tech argued that its voice packets proceeded directly through the telephone
line and described its specification as disclosing a system which operates over
a standard telephone line.'" 3 Eventually, Multi-Tech amended its claims in the
'627 patent to require a modem.
114
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the
claim construction of the district court in limiting the scope of the earlier,
already issued '649 patent based on Multi-Tech's statements during prosecu-
tion of the '627 patent.11 5 The court noted that it had previously "held that the
prosecution history of one patent is relevant to an understanding of the scope
of a common term in a second patent stemming from the same parent applica-
tion."" 6 Thus, the court held that the prosecution history of the '627 patent
was relevant to an understanding of the description of the "communications
system" disclosed in the common specification, which could then be used to
aid interpretation of the claims of the '532 and '649 patents. 1 7 The court first
held that the statements from the '627 patent's prosecution history apply to
the later issued '532 patent, a holding which required no further explana-
tion.1 8 But, the majority then extended beyond precedent in holding that, "it
[was] not unsound to apply the same interpretation to [the already issued
'649] patent. 11
9
The majority attempted to distinguish its holding in Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 120 which seemed to demand a contrary
result. 12 1 In Georgia-Pacific, the Federal Circuit held that for a patentee "to
be bound by the statement made to the PTO in connection with a later prose-
cution of a different patent, the statement would have to be one that the exam-
iner relied upon in allowing the claims in the patent at issue. ' 22 In the case at
hand, the examiner clearly could not have relied on the statements made by
Multi-Tech during prosecution of the '627 patent in allowing the claims of
the '649 patent because the claims in the '649 patent had already been al-
lowed before any of the '627 patent statements were ever made.12 The ma-
jority distinguished Georgia-Pacific by arguing that it only required that the
patentee not be bound by statements made during prosecution of the later
113. Id. at 1346.
114. Id. at 1344.
115. Id. at 1350-51.
116. Id. at 1349 (citing Laitram Corp. v. Morehouse Indus., Inc., 143 F.3d 1456,
1460 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
117. Id. at 1349-50.
118. Id. at 1350.
119. Id.
120. 195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
121. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1350.
122. Georgia-Pacific, 195 F.3d at 1333.
123. See Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1350.
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patent.124 Rather, the majority held that the statements were merely relevant
to claim interpretation of the already issued patent. 25 And, as a result, the
majority affirmed the construction of the district court which limited the '649
patent to transmission over and through a standard telephone line with a mo-
dem and excluded transmission over the internet.1
26
B. Rader's Dissent
Judge Rader, in dissent, characterized the logic of the majority opinion
as "Evel Knievel jumping the Snake River Gorge."' 27 According to Rader,
the majority "manufacture[d] an unreasonable limitation" in holding that
"over" and "through" a telephone line excludes transmission over the internet
and then improperly imported the limitation into the claims of the '649 pat-
ent. 12 Rader also took issue with the majority's finding of a "clear and un-
ambiguous disclaimer" of claim scope.' 29 The examiner did not interpret
Multi-Tech's statements as limiting the claims to transmission over a mere
telephone connection because he renewed a rejection of the claims. 3 0 That is,
the examiner felt that the '627 patent application's claims still read on the
prior art. '31 Ultimately, as Rader noted, Multi-Tech obtained an allowance
after adding the limitation of a modem.' 32 The discussion during prosecution
of the '627 application centered around the end-points of the communication
system rather than the medium of transmission.' 33 Thus, in Rader's opinion,
Multi-Tech only unambiguously disclaimed transmission over a LAN, a sys-
tem which does not connect modems at each end point. 134 And, as Rader
pointed out, at the time of this prosecution, modems using telephone lines
were the most common way to connect to the internet.
13 5
Next, Rader argued that the '649 patent should not be construed so nar-
rowly because the limitations made in the '627 patent were needed to avoid
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1350-51. Later in the opinion, the court slightly altered the district
court's claim construction with respect to other claim terms at issue. Id. at 1351-54.
These constructions were only relevant to future litigation and were not dispositive on
the current matter. Id. at 1351.
127. Id. at 1355 (Rader, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1355-57 (Rader. J., dissenting). The "Lewen" patent precluded the '627
patent from including transmission over a LAN. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1356 (Rader, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1355 (Rader, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1356 (Rader, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
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prior art that preceded the '627 patent but came after the '649 patent.' 36 He
also offered a convincing illustration to prove the illogic in the majority's
importation of the claim limitation.' 37 Finally, Rader criticized the majority
for "essentially disregard[ing] the holding of Georgia-Pacific," because the
examiner could not have possibly relied on then non-existent claim-limiting
statements when allowing the claims of the earlier '649 patent.'
38
V. COMMENT
As Judge Rader's dissent correctly argues, it defies logic to limit an al-
ready issued patent based upon statements made during prosecution of a sub-
sequent, related patent whose application was amended to avoid prior art that
was not, in fact, "prior" to the already issued patent. A basic tenet of pat-
entability is that an invention must be new, or novel, in light of existing tech-
nology, or prior art. 39 If there is no applicable prior art requiring an inventor
to narrow her claims, then the inventor should be entitled to claim the full
scope of her invention. A narrowing of a later patent performed to avoid prior
art should be limited in application to only that later patent's claims.
The majority adopted a view which, in its opinion, was "not unsound"
rather than taking a view which was sound in light of past case law.14 The
majority exceeded the bounds of "interpretation" and proceeded to limit the
claims of the '649 patent through the common specification which had been
further defined during prosecution of the later '627 patent. This further defi-
nition and narrowing of the '627 patent was required in order to avoid art that
was prior only to the '627 patent, but not prior to the '649 patent. The public
notice function of the patent system is defeated when an inventor is expected
136. Id. at 1357 (Rader, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting) ("By way of illustration, assume three patents (A,
B, and C) share a common specification directed to a method for hanging a picture.
Patent A claims an attaching step and a leveling step. Patent B claims an attaching
step and a centering step. Patent C claims only the attaching step. The prior art con-
tains a reference to attaching pictures using nails. Because they contain limitations
beyond attaching, patents A and B issue without rejection. Patent C, however, is re-
jected in light of the prior art. To distinguish the prior art, the applicant clarifies the
attaching step is limited to using Velcro, not nails. Under what logic would a court
limit the claims in Patents A and B to Velcro based on the later and inapplicable
prosecution history of Patent C? That, however, is exactly what the majority does in
this case.").
138. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting). "The '649 patent issued before the prosecution
history of the '627 patent," so it is impossible for the examiner to have relied on
statements made during prosecution of the '627 patent when allowing the claims of
the '649 patent. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
140. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1350 ("[E]ven though the '649 patent had already
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to foresee later amendments or clarifications that will be required by later art
that does not yet exist.
Certainly, it is logical to interpret later patents in light of their parent
patent. It would be improper to construe the terms in the child patent differ-
ently than those in the parent application because the child was derived from
the parent. The Federal Circuit applied this logic in Mark I Marketing Corp.
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.t41 when it held that a narrowing of claim scope
in a parent application applied to a continuation-in-part application with new
claims. 142 It also seems logical to generally conclude that a sibling application
is "relevant" to an understanding of another sibling application. 143 But, it is
illogical to cross the "fine line"' 44 of using a later sibling patent as a relevant
aid in interpreting an already issued sibling patent and to read unnecessary'
45
limitations contained in the later sibling into the already issued sibling. In this
case, there was little difference between using the statements made during the
prosecution of the '627 patent as merely relevant interpretive aids and using
them to limit Multi-Tech to patent rights covering only transmission over a
telephone line to the exclusion of the internet.
The court had applied this same reasoning in Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Inter-
national, Inc.146 when it held that a specific limitation contained in a related
application should not be read into related patents which did not need the
limitation in order to be patentable.147 Like the instant case, the '649 patent
did not need to be limited to transmission over and through a telephone line in
order to be patentable. But, the '627 patent did need to be limited because of
the intervening prior art covering transmission over a LAN. Therefore, the
telephone line limitation was improperly read into the '649 patent, which did
not require such a limitation in order to be patentable.
Lastly, Rader's view provides the most common sense answer under the
facts of this case. At the time the '649 patent was drafted and prosecuted, the
most common way to connect to the internet was by using a modem over a
standard telephone line. It was entirely plausible to argue that the relevant
language did not exclude transmission over the internet because, presumably,
transmission over a phone line would include transmission over the internet if
the phone line was used to connect to the internet.
141. 66 F.3d 285 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
142. Id. For a discussion of Mark I Marketing, see 5A CHISUM, supra note 65,
§ 18.05[2][d][iiJ, at 18-895 to -896.
143. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1349 (finding that the statements made during prose-
cution of the '627 patent are relevant to an understanding of the sibling '649 and '532
patents).
144. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
145. That is, limitations that are not necessary for the earlier patent to avoid prior
art and thus be valid.
146. 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 1322-23. For a discussion of AI-Site Corp., see 5A CHISUM, supra note
65, §18.05[2][d][ii], at 18-896 to -897.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the recent explosion of patent litigation and the new attitude cor-
porations have toward patents, claim construction issues have become and
will continue to be a critical issue in patent law.148 Many sources are relevant
as interpretive aids when district courts seek to perform the preliminary task
of claim construction in an infringement or declaratory judgment action.
Among the primary aids used by courts, prosecution history provides vital
insight into determining whether inventors have surrendered claim scope
during prosecution. Even the prosecution history of all related applications
sharing a common specification provides relevant insight during this inquiry.
But it is a dangerous practice to limit claim scope of an already issued patent
by relying on limitations added to a later sibling patent. Failure to exercise
caution when relying on related patents' prosecution history as intrinsic evi-
dence during claim construction may result in a patent owner losing claim
scope which he never surrendered during the prosecution process.
JASON R. MUDD
148. Bender, supra note 11, at 190-92 ("Increasingly, companies are using patents
to protect their market share, drive competitors out of business and boost bottom lines
through lucrative judgments and licensing fees.").
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